It is estimated that around seven million or more Nepalis are currently living abroad for employment, education, business, security, and family opportunities. Whatever the exact figure may be, the role of overseas Nepalese in Nepal\u2019s economy, society, and family life is extraordinary. Their remittances support foreign-exchange reserves, consumption, education, healthcare, and the rural economy. Their knowledge, skills, investment, and international networks are also important national assets. Yet, if they are unable to return to Nepal during elections, their voting rights effectively remain inactive. Accepting their economic contribution while keeping their political voice outside Parliament is inconsistent with the spirit of democracy. Overseas voting should therefore be understood not as a reward for remittances, but as a matter of citizenship, equality, and representation.<\/p>\n
Under Nepal\u2019s Constitution, the House of Representatives consists of 275 members\u2014165 directly elected and 110 elected through proportional representation. The current structure does not recognise overseas territories as separate electoral constituencies. The Supreme Court has directed the government to make arrangements for Nepali citizens living abroad to vote, and the Election Commission also prepared a draft \u201cProcedure for Registration and Updating of the Electoral Roll of Nepali Citizens Residing Abroad, 2080.\u201d However, because the necessary laws, reliable voter lists, diplomatic coordination, voting mechanisms, resources, and technological infrastructure have not yet been fully implemented, this right has still not become a practical reality. The debate should therefore move beyond simply asking \u201cwhether overseas Nepalis should be allowed to vote\u201d and focus instead on \u201cwhat structure can make overseas voting secure, fair, and acceptable.\u201d<\/p>\n
Two basic models of overseas voting need to be distinguished. The first is the home-constituency model, in which votes cast by overseas voters are added to one of Nepal\u2019s existing 165 constituencies based on their previous or permanent address. The second is the external constituency model, in which overseas Nepalis constitute a separate electoral geography and elect their own MPs from among candidates representing the diaspora.<\/p>\n
The first model may appear natural for people who maintain their permanent homes and affairs in Nepal, are abroad temporarily, or expect to return soon. However, for Nepalis who have lived abroad for many years and whose concerns involve labour rights, consular services, rescue and repatriation, double taxation, citizenship, social security, foreign pensions, student issues, skills, and investment, separate overseas constituencies may provide more meaningful representation.<\/p>\n
If i-voting were introduced using the existing 165 constituencies, overseas votes could potentially affect the results of every directly elected constituency in Nepal. In highly competitive seats, if a lead established through votes counted inside Nepal were overturned by digital votes arriving from abroad, disputes over acceptance of the result could arise among political parties, candidates, and voters.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, if questions emerged regarding system failures, cyberattacks, weaknesses in identity verification, or auditing, the controversy might not remain confined to one constituency. It could potentially affect vote counting, result certification, or even, in certain circumstances, re-voting across many of the 165 constituencies. This does not mean that overseas votes are less valuable. Rather, the system through which those rights are exercised should preserve the equal value of every vote while keeping electoral credibility and dispute resolution manageable.<\/p>\n
From this perspective, establishing separate overseas constituencies could be a simpler, more practical, and comparatively less challenging option. Since overseas votes would be counted only within designated external constituencies, any technical problem and its remedy could be contained within those constituencies.<\/p>\n
Overseas candidates would not need to intervene in local political power relations within Nepal\u2019s domestic constituencies, and concerns that influential diaspora groups might disproportionately affect results across the 165 constituencies could also be reduced. Nepalis with genuine experience of living abroad could stand as candidates in their own overseas constituencies, debate policies directly with diaspora voters, and, once elected, raise the specific concerns of overseas Nepalis in Parliament. All eligible overseas voters who retain Nepali citizenship should be allowed to vote under the supervision of the Election Commission.<\/p>\n
International practice demonstrates that both external voting and dedicated parliamentary representation for citizens abroad are possible. Italy has divided its overseas electorate into four geographical regions and, since 2006, has elected representatives from overseas constituencies to both chambers of Parliament; currently, eight deputies and four senators are elected from abroad. France has elected 11 members of the National Assembly from 11 overseas constituencies since 2012. Portugal reserves four seats\u2014two for Europe and two for outside Europe\u2014while Cabo Verde elects six representatives from three external constituencies.<\/p>\n
The systems of Croatia, Romania, the Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Colombia, Ecuador, and Algeria are also worth studying. These 13 countries provide useful comparative examples, while the latest International IDEA study cited in the original article indicates that at least 21 countries have special constituencies for voters residing abroad. Nepal should therefore not simply copy any one country, but develop a model appropriate to its own demographic and geographical circumstances.<\/p>\n
For Nepal, eight directly elected overseas constituencies could initially be considered as a proposal for discussion. The final distribution should not be determined until verified voter data are available. However, as a working model, three seats could be allocated to the Gulf and Middle East, two to South and East Asia, one to Europe, one to North and South America, and one to Oceania, Africa, and other regions.<\/p>\n
This should take into account the large migrant-worker population in the Gulf, the complex and widespread Nepali population across Asia\u2014including India\u2014and the geographical distances involved in the Americas and Oceania. An independent overseas constituency boundary commission should periodically review constituency boundaries and seat allocation based on registered voter numbers, geographical distance, access to embassies, labour destinations, and community continuity.<\/p>\n
Whether these eight seats should be reallocated from the existing 165 directly elected seats, whether the size of the House of Representatives should be modestly increased, or whether another constitutional arrangement should be adopted would require broad political consensus. Simply removing seats mechanically from districts with many constituencies would not be sufficient; the overall principles of population representation and constitutional equality would also need to be considered.<\/p>\n
Alongside this, another proposal worth considering would be to guarantee five proportional-representation seats under a \u201cDiaspora Cluster.\u201d Eight directly elected overseas constituencies could provide diaspora voters with MPs directly accountable to them, while five proportional seats could strengthen the representation of women, Dalits, Indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, workers, youth, and other inclusive groups.<\/p>\n
However, if eight directly elected and five proportional seats were introduced simultaneously, their impact on the total size of Parliament, proportionality, and the relative weight of votes would require constitutional assessment. These five seats should not become nomination rewards for political parties or organisations. They should be based on transparent closed lists, evidence of overseas residence, and clear inclusion criteria.<\/p>\n
Once separate overseas constituencies are established, i-voting could become the most convenient voting mechanism, although technology alone cannot provide the solution. Voter registration would require Nepali citizenship or a national identity card, biometric or other strong digital identification, one-person-one-registration safeguards, and a central register preventing duplicate voting.<\/p>\n
The voting system would require multi-factor authentication, ballot secrecy, end-to-end verifiability, independent cybersecurity audits, paper or cryptographic evidence, open technical testing, and risk-limiting audits of results. Because voting from homes or workplaces could expose voters to pressure from family members, employers, or organised groups, voters should also have the option of casting ballots privately at embassies, consulates, or approved temporary voting centres.<\/p>\n
A safer approach would be to begin with pilot programmes in selected countries or cities, followed by independent evaluation and gradual expansion after achieving sufficient political consensus.<\/p>\n
Implementation could take place in four stages. First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Election Commission, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Labour should establish reliable data on citizenship, country of residence, and voter eligibility. Second, controlled trials of digital registration and i-voting should be conducted in countries with large Nepali populations. Third, the Constitution should clearly define the structure of the House of Representatives, external constituencies, and seat allocation, while relevant laws concerning elections, electoral rolls, campaign expenditure, foreign financing, cybercrime, and dispute resolution should be amended. Fourth, an independent review should be conducted after the first overseas election to improve constituencies, seat distribution, costs, accessibility, and security.<\/p>\n
Candidacy should be open to both political-party candidates and independents, with reasonable requirements concerning genuine residence in or connection with the relevant overseas constituency. Drawing from the French model discussed in the original article, Nepal could also consider allowing overseas candidates and voters who retain Nepali citizenship to participate even where they also hold another country’s citizenship.<\/p>\n
Clear boundaries of responsibility would also be essential for maintaining credibility. The Election Commission should remain the principal administrator and decision-making authority; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nepali diplomatic missions should act as local facilitators; and independent technical bodies should conduct security assessments. Political parties, candidates, the media, and citizen observers should be allowed to monitor testing and counting.<\/p>\n
Although source code, detailed security information, or voters\u2019 personal data may not all be suitable for public disclosure, there should be sufficient transparency regarding verification procedures, audit findings, failure-management protocols, and complaint mechanisms. If internet disruption, war, or diplomatic difficulties occur in a particular country, alternative arrangements should be available, including advance voting or in-person voting at designated centres. I-voting would therefore serve as a convenient means of exercising the right to vote, rather than becoming the only gateway to that right.<\/p>\n
Providing i-voting to Nepalis abroad while retaining their existing domestic constituencies could potentially be achieved through the necessary legislation and electoral procedures. However, recognising the diaspora itself as a separate electoral constituency would require a constitutional amendment. At a time when constitutional reform is under discussion, the proposal to establish separate overseas constituencies is therefore particularly relevant.<\/p>\n
There is also an ongoing debate that Nepal already has too many constituencies. In that context, the possibility could be explored of reducing seats from districts currently having large numbers of constituencies\u2014such as Kathmandu with 10, Morang with six, Jhapa with five, Rupandehi with five, and Kailali with five\u2014and reallocating eight seats for overseas constituencies, subject to constitutional principles and proper delimitation.<\/p>\n
According to the figures cited in the article for the 2082 House of Representatives election, Nepal has 18,903,689 registered voters, while approximately seven million Nepalis are estimated to be abroad. A large proportion of overseas Nepalis are of voting age, and migration continues to increase. If citizens living abroad continue to be excluded from practical participation in elections, questions may increasingly arise about the inclusiveness and democratic legitimacy of Nepal\u2019s electoral process.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, simply granting overseas Nepalis the right to vote is not enough. Where their votes are counted and to whom their elected representatives are accountable are equally important questions. Distributing i-votes from abroad across Nepal\u2019s 165 domestic constituencies could complicate election results, public acceptance, and dispute management.<\/p>\n
By comparison, eight separate overseas constituencies, secure and phased i-voting, and a possible five-seat diaspora cluster within proportional representation could provide a better balance between voting rights, political representation, and electoral manageability. The precise numbers should ultimately be determined through verified data and constitutional consensus, but the direction is clear: Nepali citizens, wherever they live, should be able to participate in Nepal\u2019s democratic decision-making and have their voices carried into Parliament by representatives they themselves elect.<\/p>\n
As another possible transitional option, the article proposes considering whether the NRNA, given its long-established and extensive global network, could play a role in selecting representatives until a fully electoral mechanism is established. Such an approach would require an appropriate legal and constitutional framework.<\/p>\n
Recognising the diaspora not merely as an economic supporter of the nation but as a full political partner could therefore offer Nepal a simple, fair, and effective way forward.<\/p>\n
Author: Vice President, Non-Resident Nepali Association (NRNA), International Coordination Council.<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t